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"Make Us The Women We Can't Be:" 
Cloud Nine and The Female Imaginary 
Marc Silverstein 
In the second act of Caryl Churchill's Cloud Nine (1979), Victoria, Lin and 
Edward meet in a park at night to perform what they variously describe as "an 
orgy" and "a ceremony," a "sacred"1 rite during which they invoke the appearance 
of Isis, the Goddess who can "give us the history we haven't had, make us the 
women we can't be" (308). If this scene is obviously self-reflexive in a manner 
that foregrounds Churchill's project as feminist playwright, it also possesses a 
metatheatrical dimension, lending a gendered inflection to what Herbert Blau 
identifies as the fundamental urge animating all theatre, whether drama, ritual or 
performance—the urge yielding the expectancy in Edward's question (which is 
also the audience's question), "Will something appear?" (308). Whether it will 
or not, we want it. to; even more important, as Blau recognizes, it wants to. 
Something there is that wants to appear. With all the critique of a 
recessive presence, the traces of that struggle are still there, and with 
it the telltale signs of an ineliminable sense of depth that, however 
rescored as surface, comes from the refractory presence of the actual 
body in performance. The body may have been assigned the role of 
a function or a carrier of signs, but there is something restive about it, 
unsurpassed, as in the transformations of hegemony itself—not a social 
logic, however, but the logic of an unquenchable longing to be there 
in its unmediated presence: authentic.2 
Despite the subtlety and complexity of Blau's thought, the opposition 
between the body as "a carrier of signs" and the body as site of the "authentic" 
will only hold if we accept both that authenticity must necessarily refer to 
"unmediated presence," and make the leap from acknowledging the 
conventionality of the sign to seeing this conventionality as a falsification of an 
irreducible reality. If we think of authenticity, however, not as a metaphysical 
category of experience, but as a particular relationship to signifying practices, we 
no longer have to see the desire for authenticity at odds with a recognition of the 
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semiotic nature of reality. To clarify this point, let me cite the following 
example. In an article defending Luce Irigaray against charges of metaphysical 
idealism and biological essentialism, Margaret Whitford asserts that, far from 
privileging a "real" female body beyond the limits of any signifying system, 
Irigaray offers a construction of the body within a "female imaginary . . . [that 
must] accede to its own specific symboiization"3 As Whitford perceptively 
argues, Irigaray does not object to the status of the female body as "a carrier of 
signs;" rather, she wants to remove the body from its subjection to a specific 
sign-system—the patriarchal structure of representation exemplified by Freud and 
Lacan—in order to grant it the kind of resymbolization that can undermine the 
hegemony of phallocentrism. For Irigaray, then, the question is not how to 
transform the female body from "a carrier of signs" to an "unmediated presence," 
thus extracting the (corpo)Real from the snares of the Symbolic, but how to 
create what I would term an "authentic symboiization" of that body, one that will 
grant women the embodied subjectivity they currently lack. 
I will return to the example of Irigaray later in this essay. For now, I want 
to suggest that, rather than either consigning the rhetoric of authenticity to the 
trashcan of history or viewing signification and authenticity as locked in 
irremediable opposition, we deconstruct the concept of the authentic. I have in 
mind here Judith Butler's sense of deconstruction: "To deconstruct is not to 
negate or to dismiss, but to call into question and, perhaps most importantly, to 
open up a term . . . to a reusage or redeployment."4 By redeploying the concept 
of authenticity, linking it with rather than disjoining it from signifying practices, 
we can acknowledge a strategic value in a continued appeal to the term. For both 
Irigaray and Churchill, as I will argue, the desire for authenticity can only reach 
fulfillment within representation, since their "unquenchable longing to be" takes 
the form of a gender-specific (rather than an universalizable ontological) 
desire—a desire to effect a new discursive ordering and production of the body. 
In other words, their desire proves inseparable from "a social logic" and the 
structures of representation articulating that logic. 
If feminist theory finds a strategic value in the idea of an authentic 
symboiization, feminist theatre (indeed, any form of theatre) would seem to 
necessitate such a concept. Despite Blau's attempt to sever authenticity from 
signification and the onto-logic from "a social logic," his work as a whole 
repeatedly reminds us that the status of theatre as a representational activity 
confounds the very desire it provokes—the desire for full, "unmediated presence." 
There may indeed be "something . . . that wants to appear," but theatrical 
appearance exists in a fraught (if productive) dialectical tension with 
disappearance, a dialectic that plays itself out on the corporeal surface of the 
body. If we can locate the seductive power of theatre in "the refractory presence 
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of the actual body," we must, as Blau reminds us, also acknowledge that theatre 
stages "the mystery of its [the body's] vanishings;"5 that we can never be certain 
whose "actual body" we see—the actor's, the person's, the selfs, or the 
character's. Indeed, the representational logic governing much of Western 
theatre (particularly realism and psychological drama) demands the disappearance 
of the actor's polymorphous body, characterized by Josette Feral as a "semiotic 
bundle of drives,"6 in order to secure the appearance of the character—a figure 
whose ontological and existential coherence we infer from its physical unity. 
Elin Diamond observes that the presentation of dramatic character 
foregrounds "the ideological nature of representation."7 While agreeing with this 
assertion, I would want to add that what makes theatrical representation 
ideological is not simply the repression of a drive-ridden body, but the play of 
appearance and disappearance that functions as a defining characteristic of such 
theories of ideology as those offered by Louis Althusser and Jorge Larrain. I will 
dispense with summarizing the details of Althusser's now-familiar theory, but I 
do want to point out that even though he admits "that an individual is 
always-already a subject" who is born into a pre-existing ideological system, 
Althusser presents his account of how the subject emerges within the field of 
ideology "in the form of a sequence, with a before and an after, and thus in the 
form of a temporal succession." When Althusser writes, "all ideology hails or 
interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects"* we can thus read him as 
asserting that the subject appears as the subject of (and subject to) ideology only 
through the disappearance of the "concrete individual." 
For Larrain, what appears within ideology is appearance itself. Ideology 
"takes an aspect of reality, the appearances, and gives them an autonomy and 
independence which they do not actually have. In this sense ideology fetishizes 
the world of appearances, separates it from its real connections."9 If there is 
something theatrical in ideology's fetishism of appearances (as Althusser 
implicitly recognizes when he locates the process of interpellation within the 
ideological "theatre"10 of subject-formation), there is also something ideological 
in the very nature of theatre. Indeed, theatre cannot help fetishizing appearance, 
since appearance (always intertwined with disappearance) determines and 
becomes coextensive with, rather than simply forming one aspect of, dramatic 
"reality." Thus, to return to the question with which I began, when Churchill's 
Edward asks, "Will something appear?," we could counter with the question, 
since we are in the theatre, how could something—specifically, the body—not 
appear? Yet, such an answer would hardly respond to the question implied both 
by Edward's query and by Cloud Nine itself: if the body makes its appearance 
clothed in the mantle of signs, how can we be certain that its entrance upon the 
stage will yield what I have risked calling an authentic symbolization?11 
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This question reminds us that within the theatre of ideology (and the 
ideology of theatre), everything may be an appearance but not all appearances are 
created equal. Consider the opening moments of Cloud Nine: 
Clive:{H& presents Betty. She is played by a man.] My wife is all I 
dreamt a wife should be, And everything she is she owes to me. 
Betty: I live for Clive. The whole aim of my life Is to be what he 
looks for in a wife. I am a man's creation as you see, And what men 
want is what I want to be. (251) 
Betty's (dis)appearance before the audience reminds us that while women have 
never failed to appear within the ideological theatre that stages sexual difference, 
they have been cast in roles determined by the image-repertoire of masculine 
fantasy. Woman as Symptom; Woman as Fetish; Woman as Lack; Woman as 
Object of Desire; Woman as Exotic Other, Woman as, in Give's words, 
"irrational, demanding, inconsistent, treacherous, lustful" (282)—these are only 
some of the significations inscribed on the text of the female body, significations 
that foreclose the representational options through which the body could "accede 
to its own specific symbolization." 
I would emphasize the word "symbolization" in the preceding sentence. 
Certainly, when we see a male actor step forward as Betty, we register the 
non-appearance of the female body. Since, however, the theatrical body (as well 
as the ideological body) makes its appearance as always already "a carrier of 
signs," what remains absent from view is not an uncoded body in all its 
phenomenological plenitude, but a body coded in opposition to the dominant 
representational economy—a body that could occupy the site of difference rather 
than the place of the man-consolidating other of phallocentric fantasy. By 
actively soliciting our gaze ("I am a man's creation as you see" ), Churchill 
allows us to see women's role as the unseen within that economy. As Irigaray 
writes, "'Sexual difference' . . . is, now and forever, determined within the 
project, the projection, the sphere of representation, of the same . . . A man 
minus the possibility of (re)presenting oneself as a man = a normal woman."12 
It is this "possibility of (re)presenting oneself as a man" that distinguishes 
Clive's disappearance from that of Betty. Clive passes along the following 
patriarchal wisdom to his son: "You should always respect and love me, Edward, 
not for myself, I may not deserve it, but as I respected and loved my own father, 
because he was my father. Through our father we love our Queen and our God" 
(276). Clive's invocation of the Name-of-the-Father reminds us of the play of 
(dis)appearances characterizing the phallocentric order described (if not 
prescribed) by Lacan: the disappearance of the biological father and its 
Spring 1994 11 
replacement by the Symbolic Father; the disappearance of the anatomical organ 
and its replacement by the paternal metaphor; the disappearance of the penis and 
its replacement by the phallus. Clive's "self-effacement," his designation of the 
signifying space labelled "father" rather than himself as the locus of authority, 
thus opens up a space between the individual and the subject position that always 
exceeds whoever occupies it. 
If Clive's "disappearance" reveals that he does not possess power, but serves 
as a mouthpiece for the codes of cultural power speaking (through) him, it 
nevertheless allows him to situate himself on the side of power. Similarly, while 
it is true that, as a signifier rather than an anatomical fact of difference, the 
phallus resists any simple attempt to conflate it with the penis, it is also true that, 
for Lacan, possessing the penis allows men the kind of access to the 
phallus-as-transcendental-signifier that women can never totally attain. Since "it 
is through the phallic function that man takes up his inscription as all,"13 we can 
see a fundamental asymmetry in the gendered disappearing act through which the 
subject enters (or fails to enter) the Symbolic order, the realm of representation. 
Clive can represent himself as a man, he can inscribe himself "as all," because 
he has a penis which can "disappear" and thus allow him to reappear in the 
subject position of the Symbolic Father. Betty, on the other hand, as a woman, 
is, in Lacan's terms, "not all." She can represent herself neither as a man nor as 
a woman since, according to the logic of phallocentrism, being a woman means 
failing to appear as a subject of representation. As Lacan writes, "There is 
woman only as excluded by the nature of things which is the nature of words."14 
Excluded from the Symbolic, Betty can only appear as the object of 
representation, as the "man's creation" we see in the play's opening sequence. 
Betty's inability to appear as a subject within the dominant representational 
economy suggests what is at stake for Churchill in the appeal to Isis, "Give us 
the history we haven't had, make us the women we can't be." Blau calls theatre 
the scene of the body's "unquenchable longing to be there;" a feminist theatre 
practice, however, must determine the nature of "there" before approaching the 
questions of subjectivity and authentic symbolization. Whether or not one finds 
Lacan complicitous with the phallocentric logic he describes, his work details the 
ideological operations of the "there" in which women can never be—the 
representational economy that offers women a highly problematized relation to 
speech, language and subjectivity. Throughout the first act, Churchill repeatedly 
demonstrates the representational violence—that possesses very real cultural 
effects—to which women are subjected in their role as the "not all." If Betty, 
played by a male actor, lacks a body that can "accede to its own specific 
symbolization," Victoria lacks any body. Represented by a dummy in the first 
act, the "figure" of Victoria serves to link the female body's exile from authentic 
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symbolization to women's exclusion from "the nature of words" within the 
patriarchal Symbolic. Similarly, Ellen's declarations of lesbian desire are 
rerouted into the culturally-sanctioned paths of heterosexuality, marriage and 
reproduction. That she will marry the homosexual Harry Bagley provides yet 
another triumph for an ideology of gender and sexuality that refuses either to 
represent or tolerate the otherness of the other—an ideology that erases difference 
through the inscription of the (no-longer) other within what Irigaray calls "the 
project, the projection, the sphere of representation, of the same." 
If this patriarchal ideology enforces heterosexuality, it demands that the 
female body appear only as the object of masculine desire. Unlike the other 
women in the first act, Mrs. Saunders refuses to accept a representational 
economy that denies women the opportunity to fashion a desiring female body. 
Declaring, "I do like the sensation. Well I'll have it then, I'll have it, I'll have 
it" (263), Mrs. Saunders attempts to convert her role as object of Clive's desire 
into a subject position through which the body can experience a jouissance 
beyond the phallus, exceeding the limits of patriarchal signification. Yet again, 
however, a woman must confront her status as the "not all," excluded from 
pleasure as well as from speech. During one sexual encounter, Clive "disappears 
completely under her skirt" (263), emerging only after he has reached orgasm: 
Clive: I came. 
Mrs. Saunders: I didn't. 
Clive: I'm all sticky. 
Mrs. Saunders: What about me? Wait. 
Clive: All right, are you? Come on. We musn't be found. 
Mrs. Saunders: Don't go now. (264) 
Referring to the jouissance that women enjoy beyond the phallus, Lacan 
concludes that it is "impossible to tell whether the woman can say anything about 
it."15 Both Mrs. Saunders and Ellen (and it is certainly no coincidence that 
Churchill calls for the two roles to be performed by the same actress) seek 
pleasure beyond the phallus—Ellen, in the lesbianism that would place in 
jeopardy both the physical and ideological reproduction of patriarchy, and Mrs. 
Saunders, in heterosexual activity that threatens to reveal Clive as a "real" man 
with a penis, not a Symbolic Father possessing the phallus, the Symbolic order's 
privileged signifier. Pace Lacan, these two women can say something about 
desire and pleasure, but they say it within a representational and ideological 
structure that will not recognize their speech, just as Clive ignores Mrs. Saunders' 
question, "What about me?" 
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Like "what do women want?," the question Freud said women could not 
pose since they themselves were the question, "what about me"—a question about 
desire, pleasure, subjectivity and the body—will only receive an answer through 
the elaboration of signifying practices that support a female imaginary. "You 
can't separate fucking and economics" (309), says Victoria in the second act, but 
you can separate the question of female sexual pleasure from a representational 
economy designed to reinforce the play of patriarchal power relations, and 
transfer it to a representational sphere in which the body can achieve authentic 
symbolization. Again, I would emphasize that such "authenticity" can only 
emerge from a signifying practice. When Victoria asks Isis to "make us the 
women we can't be," she implicitly acknowledges that any subject position in 
which women appear emerges through a representational practice; that the 
problem is not how to escape signification, but how to create an oppositional 
signifying space in which to answer the question, "what about me?" 
Churchill had already articulated the need for such a space, an alternative 
representational economy in which opposition to patriarchal power relations could 
express itself, in Vinegar Tom (1976), a play set in the seventeenth century 
exploring how women seeking economic and sexual autonomy were labelled 
witches. Churchill shows that a representational category like "witch" possesses 
very real and very destructive effects when the representation finds cultural 
support in such institutions as the courts and the church—ideological apparatus 
that can compel women to live and die within the subject position of the witch. 
The cultural order empowered through these ideological and representational 
structures appears monolithic not so much because it forecloses resistance, but 
because it sets the terms in which resistance can achieve utterance. Before being 
hung, Alice gives voice to such resistance: 
I'm not a witch. But I wish I was. If I could live I'd be a witch now 
after what they've done . . . Oh if I could meet with the devil now I'd 
give him anything if he'd give me power. There's no way for us 
except by the devil. If I only did have magic, I'd make them feel it.16 
Despite the emotional intensity of Alice's speech, we cannot miss the irony 
of her desiring to occupy the very subject position that provides the "justification" 
for the exercise of power that will destroy her. Indeed, there is nothing in her 
words that could not help reinforce the power of a cultural order that will allow 
women to appear only to ensure their disappearance—the violent disappearance 
concretized in the bodies of the two hanging women dominating the stage 
throughout the final scenes of Vinegar Tom. 
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What Vinegar Tom and Cloud Nine suggest (indeed, what Churchill's work 
as a whole suggests), is that opposition to and transformation of social 
organization and the network of ideological apparatus supporting that organization 
cannot separate itself from the establishment of an alternative representational 
framework in which to produce new subject positions. Churchill's plays 
exemplify Irigaray's observation, "we can neither decide nor hope to liberate 
ourselves from a given order without changing the [representational] forms of that 
order."17 For both Churchill and Irigaray, whatever else a feminist politics might 
entail, it presents itself as a politics of representation—a politics that contests 
patriarchal structures of representation at the level of cultural representation itself. 
Throughout this essay, I have linked Churchill and Irigaray not only because 
Irigaray provides a valuable theoretical framework through which to interpret 
Churchill, but because they share a politics of representation that bases itself on 
a return of the repressed—specifically, the return of what Irigaray calls "that 
repressed entity, the female imaginary." Victoria's longing for "the history we 
haven't had" testifies to the urgent need for this imaginary that, as Margaret 
Whitford remarks, "accede[s] to its own specific symboliozation." Women, for 
both Churchill and Irigaray, lack history because they have been confined within 
/ws(s)tory, within a masculine imaginary that "imprisonfs] us in enclosed spaces 
where we cannot keep on moving, living, as ourselves."18 
A different history demands a different space, a different scene of 
appearance, a different coding of the female body, perhaps the most immediate 
"enclosed space" to which phallocentric discourse confines women. Coded within 
this discourse as objects of loathing or objects of desire, objects of loathing 
because objects of desire, women's bodies function both as sites for the 
inscription of masculine power and as the vanishing site of that power. Such 
corporeal duplicity provokes the almost incoherent jumble of erotic longing, fear 
and sadism that characterizes Clive's desire for Mrs. Saunders: "Caroline, if you 
were shot by poisoned arrows do you know what I'd do? I'd fuck your dead 
body and poison myself. Caroline, you smell amazing. You terrify me. You are 
dark like this continent. Mysterious. Treacherous." (263) 
It is hardly surprising that Clive locates the source of women's fascination, 
enigmatic terror and poisonous contamination in the vagina, which, as Irigaray 
reminds us, phallocentric discourse represents only as a tear in the 
representational fabric; "a 'hole' in . . . [the] scoptophilic lens." The vagina only 
appears as that which has always already disappeared; rather than a sexual organ 
that women possess, it is represented as a space proclaiming the absence of the 
penis and "the horror of nothing to see" In an attempt to negotiate this "horror," 
phallocentric discourse speaks of women's "'lack,' 'atrophy' (of the sexual 
organ), and 'penis envy.'"19 Whether seen as terrifying and empowered or as 
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abject and envious, women are always viewed through the lens of a 
representational system that is neither monologic nor monolithic; that can become 
the site of ideological and hegemonic struggle. Irigaray reminds us that the 
(non-)representation of the vagina is itself susceptible to contestatory 
appropriation: "The *no sex' that has been assigned to the woman can mean that 
she does not have 'a' sex and that her sex is not visible nor identifiable or 
representable in a definite form."20 
I emphasize the words "can mean" to underscore the fact that Irigaray does 
not attempt to describe the reality of a female body lying buried beneath the 
weight of a distorting sign system. Rather, she acknowledges that the image of 
the body she will propose can only appear through acceding to meaning; through 
a female imaginary theorized in relation to the symbolic agency of language and 
representation. The female imaginary will both re-mark women's bodies and 
contest the process of specialization through which those bodies have yielded 
up their "truth" to an inquisitorial masculine gaze. The re-symbolized female 
body will occupy a site beyond sight, a space not referable to the privileged 
values of the male imaginary: "the privilege of unity, form of the self, of the 
visible; of the specularisible, of the erection (which is the becoming in a form)."21 
Irigaray's concept of the female imaginary would seem to pose a challenge 
to the creation of a feminist theatre practice such as Churchill undertakes. I 
argued earlier that there is something ideological in the very nature of theatre, 
since it cannot help but fetishize appearances. Because these appearances belong 
primarily to the order "of the visible, of the, specularisible," we can identify 
theatre as a specific kind of ideological apparatus—an institution supporting 
phallocentric culture. Rather than foregrounding the ontological gap between 
actor and character, conventional theatre encourages us to ignore this disjunctive 
and to forget that how we see and what we see are structured by the performance 
itself. By inviting us to accept the givenness of whatever occupies the field of 
vision, conventional theatre naturalizes and, as it were, "ideologizes" the process 
of looking—the process that objectifies the female body by coding it for 
"to-be-looked-at-ness"22 
If theatre necessarily organizes itself as a realm of appearances that appeal 
to the logic of the gaze, how can Churchill, or any feminist theatre practice, 
intervene in its operations without to some extent recuperating the fetishism of 
the visible? To suggest an answer to this question, let me repeat my earlier 
remark that by calling for a male actor to play Betty in the first act, by showing 
us a "woman's" body unable to achieve authentic symbolization, Churchill lets 
us see women's role as the unseen within the dominant representational economy. 
Furthermore, by foregrounding the highly theatrical and non-mimetic nature of 
the "impossible objects"23 she places in our visual field, Churchill turns vision 
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against itself by encouraging us to recognize the limits of the gaze outside the 
theatre. Like Brecht before her, Churchill seeks to stand the ideology of theatre 
on its head; to show the operations that produce what Larrain calls the ideological 
separation of "the world of appearances . . . from its real connections," rather 
than reinforcing the autonomy of appearances. Cloud Nine suggests both that 
what can be seen in the field of vision that "discovers" the truth of the female 
body is a function of the field's ideological structure and the body's ideological 
structure, and that what can be seen determines what must remain unseen. 
Like Irigaray, however, Churchill does not merely critique the ideological 
structures governing the representation of sexual difference. Rather, she 
dramatizes the self-inscription of a female body that resists enclosure within the 
various representational categories to which patriarchal culture would confine it. 
In Betty's speech describing her sexual awakening, and in the image concluding 
the play—the embrace between the male actor who plays Betty in the first act 
and the actress who plays her in the second act—Churchill stages the female 
imaginary, in which the body can both appear and, In Irigaray's words, remain 
irreducible to "a definite form" 
This last point is particularly important; while both Irigaray and Churchill 
attempt to undermine the hegemony of the masculine gaze, the specific object of 
their critique is less the act of looking in and of itself than the ideology of the 
gaze, an ideology investing the gaze with the power to reduce multiplicity, 
fluidity and excess (in terms of which they code the female body) to the contours 
of "a definite form," a corporeal essence subjected to the interminable 
surveillance of patriarchal culture. Michel Foucault concisely identifies the role 
of the gaze as an ideological support of phallocentrism in his discussion of "the 
structure . . . of invisible visibility . . . [The gaze] chooses a line that instantly 
distinguishes the essential; it therefore goes beyond what it sees; it is not misled 
by the immediate forms of the sensible, for it knows how to traverse them; it is 
essentially demystifying."24 
Against this logic of the "demystifying" gaze, both Irigaray and Churchill 
offer a logic of (self-) exchange and flux, a logic of the touch. Irigaray 
elaborates this logic through the trope of the "two lips." It is the "contact of at 
least two (lips) which keeps woman in touch with herself, but without the 
possibility of distinguishing what is touching from what is touched . . . [Woman] 
is neither one nor two . . . she cannot be identified either as one person, or as 
two." In this female imaginary, no amount of specular power can reduce the 
"two lips" to a single entity with "a definite form." At the same time, however, 
the ceaseless contact of the lips excludes the possibility of conceptualizing them 
as two (hence divisible into one). Within this imaginary, the female body can 
finally achieve an authentic symbolization; it can "be there" as a female body 
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rather than as "the negative, the underside, the reverse of the only visible and 
morphologically designatable organ . . . : the penis."25 
Rejecting "a definite form," the lips can neither appropriate nor be 
appropriated; emphasizing contiguity without absorption, they locate female 
sexual pleasure in a continuous auto-erotic exchange that allows the body to 
discover its irreducible otherness without becoming bifurcated into subject and 
object. Dispensing with the mediating agency of either the anatomically real 
penis or the Symbolic phallus, the female imaginary offers a jouissance that 
contests and works to supplant the dominant representational and specular 
economies: "Woman 'touches herself all the time, and moreover no one can 
forbid her to do so, for her genitals are formed of two lips in continuous contact. 
Thus, with herself, she is already two . . . that caress each other."26 
Like Irigaray, Churchill also supplants the logic of the gaze with an 
auto-erotic jouissance that defies specula(riza)tion. In the second act of Cloud 
Nine, Betty, now played by a woman, leaves Clive, but only arrives at a sense of 
her own specificity through engaging in an act of touching. The speech in which 
Betty describes this experience is worth quoting at some length: 
I thought if Clive wasn't looking at me there wasn't a person there. 
And one night in bed in my flat I was so frightened I started touching 
myself. I thought my hand might go through space. I touched my 
face, it was there, my arm, my breast, and my hand went down where 
I thought it shouldn't, and I thought well there is somebody there. It 
felt very sweet. . . and I felt myself gathering together more and 
more . . . and there was this vast feeling growing in me and all round 
me . . . and no one could stop me and I was there and coming and 
coming. Afterwards I thought I'd betrayed Clive . . . But I felt 
triumphant because I was a separate person from [him]. (316) 
Betty's speech preserves the same movement from negation to affirmation 
that we find in Irigaray's description of the female Imaginary. Initially, the desire 
to touch, to establish what I would call a tactile economy, arises in direct 
response to, and critique of, the specular economy that will only allow women 
to appear as objects at the cost of disappearing as subjects; that will only "satisfy" 
Betty's "unquenchable longing to be there" by allowing her to appear as the 
object of Clive's gaze, "a man's creation as you see." Against the scopic regime 
with its valorization of "definite form," Betty establishes a relationship with the 
body that dissociates subjectivity from a position (with all the sense of definable 
boundaries that the spatial metaphor implies), reconstituting it as dispersal across 
multiple positions. The body itself traverses these positions, moving from "// was 
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there" to "there is somebody there" to" / was there." In this movement from "it" 
to "I," the body remains indistinguishable from, yet irreducible to, the "self' 
labelled Betty. Indeed, the "I" that Betty names herself eschews even the fictive 
coherence of the ego emerging from the Lacanian mirror stage. She can say "I 
was there" only through the agency of the jouissance "beyond the phallus" that 
disallows the formation of a circumscribed "there" in which the "I" could congeal 
into a settled subject. For Churchill, the embodied female subject is a 
"subject-in-process,"27 acceding to subjectivity through her own dialectic of 
appearance and disappearance, the ceaseless dialectic of "gathering together" and 
orgasmic dissolution. 
Subject/object, self/other, active/passive, caresser/caressed—all oppositional 
categories become undone through the logic of the touch. In this tactile 
economy, as Irigaray writes, "woman derives pleasure from what is so near that 
she cannot have it, nor have herself. . . This puts into question all prevailing 
economies."28 Despite my account of Betty's speech, however, I think we must 
ask if it does succeed in questioning the dominant representational economies. 
I have been concerned with this speech as an utterance, a narrative Betty relates 
concerning her sexual awakening. Within the theatre, however, narrative does not 
exist independently of the dramatic representation of the act of narrating, and at 
this moment of the play narrative and the act of narrating conflict with each 
other. Specifically, we hear Betty describe a logic of the touch in which the 
female body resists objectification as "a definite form." At the same time, 
however, we see this speech being spoken by "a definite form" by a figure 
uniting the bodies of character and actress into a corporeal whole. 
We can concisely state the problem Churchill confronts by remembering 
Margaret Whitford's observation that what is at stake for Irigaray is not simply 
the assertion of a female imaginary, but the elaboration of a signifying system in 
which that imaginary can achieve symbolization. As I have suggested, with its 
emphasis on suturing the ontological rift between performer and character and 
encouraging the audience to perceive character as a physical and existential unity, 
the ideology of representation characterizing much of Western theatre precludes 
the kind of authentic symbolization within which Irigaray seeks to inscribe the 
imaginary. To achieve this symbolization within the theatre, Churchill would 
have to develop an alternative model of corporeal representation—the kind of 
model, as I will now argue, she offers in the final moment of the play. 
Cloud Nine concludes with an image at once utterly simple in its 
presentation, yet remarkably complex in its implications. Shortly after Betty's 
speech, the play ends with a representation of the jouissance she describes, a 
representation that becomes the "referent" of her speech. Betty stands alone on 
stage. Then, "Betty from Act One comes. Betty and Betty embrace" (320). Elin 
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Diamond critiques this conclusion, accusing Churchill of opting for "transcendence 
. . . comic closure and narrative teleology rather than decentered play."29 The 
charge of imposing closure, if true, would seriously undermine ChurchilFs 
project, for Diamond implies that the playwright purchases a definite aesthetic 
and generic form for her work by suggesting (if not actually showing) the 
absorption of Betty's multiplicity into a new unity. 
Viewed from an Irigarayan perspective, however, closure and unity are 
disallowed by the image of the two Bettys, which, like the "two lips," are not 
divisible into one. Rather than suggesting an androgynous union, the embrace of 
actor and actress images the "ceaseless exchange of herself with the other"30 that 
Irigaray codes as internal to the female body. It is precisely because this 
exchange is "ceaseless" that the other can preserve its otherness, rather than being 
absorbed and cancelled, within the self. Within the female imaginary, and the 
logic of the touch it valorizes, such otherness never becomes the basis for the 
elaboration of the binary and binding categories of self and other. Just as for 
Irigaray "herself' and "the other" are constantly shifting their positions, so 
Churchill's description of the touch—"Betty and Betty embrace"—refuses to 
distinguish subject and object, self and other; pleasure is neither given nor 
received, but endlessly circulates between the two figures who are "neither one 
nor two." 
Not only does the embrace allow Churchill to grant authentic symbolization 
to the female body, releasing it from the confining categories of the masculine 
imaginary, it also allows her to symbolize the multiple forms of pleasure that 
body can enjoy. I have discussed this embrace as a representation of the 
auto-eroticism through which Betty derives pleasure from her own otherness, but 
such a claim reduces the phenomonological complexity of the image Churchill 
stages. While it is undeniably true that we register the embrace as occurring 
between the two characters (a term we must always use rather loosely in 
connection with Churchill's theatre) we have come to identify as Betty, we also 
see this as an embrace between two women; that is, an embrace between two 
figures whose clothing (and any other external signifiers a director may choose) 
identifies them as women. Finally, of course, because there is no attempt to trick 
the audience into perceiving the male actor from the first act as a "real" woman, 
we see the touch as an embrace between a woman and a man. 
Churchill thus stages an economy of female pleasure in which auto-eroticism, 
homo-eroticism and hetero-eroticism all coexist without competing for hierarchical 
pride of place. Indeed, the reinscription of heterosexuality within the tactile 
economy of the female imaginary marks a decisive difference between Churchill 
and Irigaray. The latter implies an ineluctable opposition between women's 
auto-erotic jouissance and a heterosexuality she describes as a "violent break-in" 
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to which the female body must submit. Churchill's work, on the other hand, 
suggests that, because it is mediated by representational and signifying 
economies, heterosexuality can change its status as a "real" practice through 
changing the representations that govern its performance. If the female imaginary 
supplants phallocentric representation, then heterosexuality need no longer be 
symbolized or lived as an opposition between the male, granted the status of 
Absolute Subject because endowed with "the noble phallic organ," and the 
female, reduced to a "non-sex."31 By dramatizing an embrace that is 
simultaneously auto-, homo-, and hetero-erotic, Churchill proposes the possibility 
of an heterosexual practice governed by the logic of the touch; governed by 
fluidity, multiplicity and reciprocity. 
On the "cloud nine" that Churchill imagines—a realm of sexual possibility 
where the domination of the gaze yields to the self-effacement of the touch— 
women will finally satisfy their "unquenchable longing to be there" through a 
jouissance that offers them contact with the other's constitutive alterity: the 
otherness within the female body, the otherness of other female bodies, the 
otherness of male bodies. The importance of Cloud Nine for the development of 
a contemporary feminist performance practice lies in Churchill's ability to 
represent the possibility for such jouissance, her ability to utilize the stage for 
granting "its own specific symbolization" to the female imaginary and its logic 
of the touch. Julia Kristeva has remarked that "feminist practice can only be 
negative, at odds with what already exists so that we may say 'that's not it' and 
'that's still not it.'"32 While Cloud Nine quite obviously says "that's not it" to 
phallocentric structures of representation, it manages to move beyond simple (or 
even complex) negation to affirm a representational sphere in which women can 
appear. 
Such affirmation distinguishes Churchill from feminist playwrights like 
Marguerite Duras, Maria Irene Fornes or Marsha Norman. Despite the vast 
stylistic and thematic differences between the work of these three women (and 
it is because of such differences that I choose them as examples), they share a 
sense of women's inescapable immurement within the categories of a 
phallocentric economy possessing absolute hegemony over the representation of 
gender. Churchill, on the other hand, remains committed to the search for new 
representational forms, new strategies for encoding the body, new ways to 
organize the sex/gender relations in which we live. This last point is particularly 
important; by foregrounding Churchill's emphasis on questions of representation, 
I do not want to give the impression that she retreats from the real cultural 
conditions to which feminism addresses itself into a rarefied realm of aestheticism. 
Rather, she understands that our negotiation of the lived experience (if I may use 
such a term) of sexuality and gender is mediated, if not governed, by 
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representational and signifying economies. Cloud Nine remains perhaps the 
strongest evidence of Churchill's attempt to elaborate such an economy—the 
representational sphere without which neither a feminist theatrical practice nor a 
feminist political practice will prove capable of giving women the history they 
haven't had, making them the women that phallocentrism says they can't be. 
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